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Abstract: Do the social, economic and political environment in a country affect
agricultural efficiency? We address this question by estimating a stochastic frontier
model of agricultural productivity in 138 countries from 1984 to 2013. By observing
how the business condition, level of social harmony and quality of government in a
country affect agricultural inefficiency, we find there to be a positive effect. However,
land quality as quantified by percentage of land irrigated, and openness to global
trade have a more positive effect on decreasing agricultural productivity. We also find
that consistent with literature, former British colonies exhibit higher technical
efficiency.
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1. Introduction
Agriculture accounts for approximately 2.8% of overall world income (World Bank, 2012)
which, considering other sectors, is not monumental. However, in the context of development
economics, it is important to not overlook the impact the agricultural sector could have in
changing many lives, poverty alleviation and improving overall economic well-being.
Globally, employment in agriculture has declined drastically but steadily over the past
decades. In 1991, 42% of the world’s total population were involved in agriculture but as of
2017, that number has decreased to approximately 29% (World Bank, 2018). The decline in
agricultural participation, however, is mainly driven by developed nations as they transition
from agricultural economies to industrialized economies. However, certain regions have seen
growth in agricultural employment. Between 1999 to 2009, growth in agricultural
employment accounted for 50% of total employment growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,
agricultural employment growth accounted for 33% of total employment growth in South
Asia (FAO, 2012). This shows that many developing countries are largely agrarian. 70% of
total participation in agriculture, approximately 1.3 billion people, are from low-income
countries where agriculture is their primary source of livelihood.
Therefore, given that many of today’s developing countries are largely agrarian with a
majority of the population depending on agriculture for food and employment, growth in
productivity has become a major focus. In addition, productivity growth is essential to meet
the demand of the steady rapidly increasing population in terms of food and raw materials
(Coelli & Rao, 2005). Past literature has shown that growth in agricultural productivity plays
a major role in meeting the ever-increasing global demand for food and in improving food
security (Griliches, 1957; Piesse and Thirtle, 2010; Alston and Pardey, 2014; Fugile and
Toole, 2014 etc.).
Thus, many interventions targeting the increase in productivity have taken place. Most
importantly was the inclusion of technological advancements, especially during the green
revolution in the 1960s, which saw a large increase in productivity. This success was
attributed to high rates of investment in proper irrigation, fertilizer, seed development, crop
research, infrastructure and market development as well as crop genetic improvements.
Between 1960 to 2000, developing countries saw an increase in wheat yield of 208%, rice was
109%, maize 157% and continued high yields in other crops with China and other Asian
countries experiencing stronger yield growth (Pingali, 2012).
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There is strong evidence that agricultural research and development has a large impact
on productivity growth and that it has the most consistent influence on observed multifactor
productivity growth (Griliches 1973; Kendrick and Grossman 1980; Sveikauskaus and
Sveikauskaus 1982). However, these global aggregates, as shown in Figure 1, mask the
underlying geographic disparities between countries. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to
explore the main causes of the discrepancies we see in productivity, especially in middle to
low income countries. Most of these countries are largely agrarian with a large portion of
their population dependent on agriculture. Yet we consistently observe low food production
growth per capita in Sub-Saharan African countries compared to other economies.
Several studies have analyzed the cross-country differences in agricultural productivity
(Hayami and Ruttan, 1970 and 1971; Kawagoe et al. 1985; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993, 1997,
1998, 1999; Lusigi and Thirtle, 1997; Coelli and Rao, 1998 etc.). Each study uses different
econometrical methods and yet the results seem to be consistent in showing global increases
in total factor productivity and aggregate increases in efficiency. Moreover, they also show
significantly large changes in total factor productivity (TFP) in Asia, mainly due to China,
compared to very small changes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Coelli and Rao (2005), perform a
cross-country examination of TFP growth and show that Asia performed best with annual
TFP growth of 2.9% while growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 0.6%. This is shown in
Figure 2.
Past literature has chalked this discrepancy to the late introduction of private research
programs in Africa, or the lag in breeding efforts of plants that were of relative importance
to African farmers (Pingali 2012). While some others have blamed it on low labor
productivity in the region (Lusigi and Thirtle 1997; Piesse and Thirtle 2010).
In addition, the primary focus of past research has been in increasing productivity. This
approach assumes that farmers are already producing at their maximum capacity. It also
assumes that there is uniformity in technology and agricultural inputs such as land, labor,
livestock and machinery. However, given the discrepancies we see in productivity, we cannot
make these bold claims.
This paper instead, looks at the factors that keep farmers from reaching their maximum
capacity, given their level of input and technology. What makes them less efficient. Efficiency
studies on agricultural productivity have been carried out by authors such as Belbase and
Grabowski (1985) and Abdulai et. al (2013).
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However, Fulginiti et al. (2004) look at how institutions affect agricultural efficiency in
Sub-Saharan Africa. They conclude that former UK colonies exhibit higher productivity
gains, while former Portuguese colonies show net reductions in productivity (Fulginiti et al.
2004). This view that historical institutions (colonial heritage etc.) in a country could explain
the discrepancies we observe in agricultural productivity is the main motivation behind this
paper. However, instead of looking at historical institutions, we look at present day
institutions in the form of country risk indicators.
To provide a wider understanding of the literature of institutions and agricultural
productivity, we will first discuss the literature on agriculture and economic productivity and
afterwards look at how that knowledge has been applied to agricultural productivity.
1.1 Institutions and Economic Outcomes
North (1990) defines institutions as “rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. In their paper, The Role of
Institutions in Growth and Development (2008), Acemoglu and Robinson borrow from
North’s (1997) definition of institutions clarifying that the major effect of institutions is
through incentives. Therefore, they state that since these institutions are key determinants
of incentives, then they should have major effects on economic outcomes including growth
and development, inequality and poverty (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
This notion has been proven by many cross-country studies that have looked at various
institutional indicators and their effect on economic outcomes. For example, Knack and
Keefer (1997) look at the effect of social capital, measured in trust and civic cooperation, on
economic performance (GDP and investment). They find that trust and cooperation is
stronger in countries with low inequality, high literacy rate and institutions that restrain
government and chief executive officers. Their results show that institutional factors such as
a well-developed financial sector, secure property rights, reliable contracts etc. are important
for a productive economy.
Similarly, Mauro (1995) looks at the impact of corruption on economic growth and finds
that corruption negatively impacts investment and therefore, economic growth. Djankov et
al. (2002) look at the regulation of entry for new firms across different countries and find that
countries with stricter entry barriers have lower institutional quality. They find that the
stricter regulations are usually associated with higher corruption, large inequality rates and
more unofficial economies. They also found that less democratic countries, countries with less
restraints on political ruling, with interventionist governments, tend to have strict barriers
to entry. Other studies have looked at the impact of education on economic outcomes as well
3

and have found a positive correlation (Barro and Lee, 2001; Aghion et al., 2009; Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2010).
Thus, correlation observed between specific institutional factors and economic outcomes,
have led many economists to believe that the political, economic and socio-economic build of
a nation could have a significant impact on growth and development.
1.2 Institutions and Agricultural Outcomes
Although many studies have looked at the effect of institutions on economic outcomes,
there has been little empirical analysis done on the specific institutional qualities that affect
agricultural outcomes. As stated earlier, agriculture is important to development as many of
the world’s poorest are employed in the sector and rely on it, not only for income, but also
for food. Thus, this study, much like other correlational studies, seeks to look at the specific
institutional qualities that affect agricultural outcomes. The results could help inform policy
by identifying the specific institutional factors lead to the discrepancies we observe in
agricultural productivity.
There have been several conceptual and theoretical analysis on the impact of
institutions on agricultural development (Slangen, 2001; Leach et al. 1999; Pretty and
Chamber,1993). Zylberstajn (2009), in his paper, found that with the increase in technological
advancement in Brazil, having a strong government system that fosters deeper interaction
between local governments, multinational corporation and stakeholder groups is essential to
further development. Cloete (2013), in his study of institutions and agricultural development
in South Africa, also found that having a strong governance structure is essential to
agricultural development. He emphasizes the need for public-private partnerships, water user
associations, proper rural finance systems, equity sharing and better human capital through
education.
In his conceptual study on the impact of institutions on agriculture in ancient France,
Hoffman (1988) looks at how the political society in the old regime worked to the detriment
of agriculture. He compares the productivity of land and labor in France with England’s
productivity and finds that the political system, including the weak French legislation at that
time, to be the main cause for the failure in agriculture.
These studies point to the role of institutions on agricultural productivity, however they
are theoretical in nature. Fulginiti et al. (2004), take on a more empirical view of the subject
however, drawing from Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001, 2005 and 2013) view on
institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that the political, economic and
socioeconomic institutions we see today are themselves products of historical institutions
4

such as colonial rule and former political structures. The authors argue that these could
explain the current institutions at play today which could explain the different economic
outcomes we observe. Following this theory, Fulginiti et al. (2004) look at how colonial
history, conflicts and democratic quality affect agricultural outcomes for countries in SubSaharan Africa. Fulginiti et al. (2004) through empirical analysis, find that former UK
colonies exhibited higher productivity gains compared to other countries, while former
Portuguese and Belgium colonies showed reduction in productivity. They also find that there
is a significant reduction in productivity during conflicts and wars and countries with better
political rights and democratic quality exhibited higher productivity.
For this study, we will be following Fulginiti et al.’s (2004) empirical analysis, however
we will be looking at what present day economic, political and socioeconomic factors affect
agricultural productivity performance. To accomplish this, we divide the ICRG variables into
three groups; Business Conditions, Social Harmony and Government Quality. We look at
these indicators separately and together, controlling for exogenous factors such as land
quality, labor quality, openness to trade and environmental conditions, all consistent with
Fulginiti et. al (2004). The results show that on their own, these institutional indicators are
negative and significant which indicates that they decrease inefficiency. However, when we
combine them together, they lose their significance and we find a stronger effect in the land
quality variable, Irrigation. This strong significance in irrigation, supports the findings by
Block (1994), Frisvold and Ingram (1995), Thirtle et al. (1995), Chang-Kang et al. (1999) and
Fulginiti et al. (2004).
Following this introduction, Section 2 of our paper presents a description of our analytical
approach; the stochastic production frontier model. Section 3 presents our data and empirical
specification. Section 4 examines our main empirical results, and we summarize and present
conclusions in section 5.

2. Analytical Approach: The Stochastic Production Frontier Model
Productivity is measured by output per unit of input. Following Fulginiti et al. (2004),
we adopt the production function approach as pioneered by Solow and Griliches. Griliches
(1998) used the Cobb Douglas production function to estimate total factor productivity, while
introducing a variable, that represented the effect of research and development. Aigner et al.
(1997) and Meeusen et al. (1977) modified the production form however, to reflect technical
inefficiencies, thus the standard neoclassical production function became a stochastic
production frontier.
5

In this study, we analyze countries’ technical inefficiency to identify the institutional
factors that explain the discrepancies we observe in productivity between countries. The
stochastic production frontier model estimates the maximum output level for a country based
on a given set of production inputs. Thus, the difference between the country’s maximum
output and its actual output is defined as the technical inefficiency. Following Battese and
Coelli (1995) the general specification of the frontier model is:
(1)

𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 )

where subscripts i and t are country and year indices respectively. Y represents the real
output of the country, X is an N x 1 vector of production inputs and is a vector of coefficients.
is the error term in equation (1) consisting of the random error, which is assumed to be
normally distributed i.i.d. N(0,).
The technical inefficiency estimated by , is a non-negative random variable, with a
truncated normal distribution with mean i.i.d. N(µ, ). The mean as defined by Wang and
Wong (2012) is represented as a linear function of certain determinants:
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝛿 = 𝛿0 + ∑𝑀
𝑚=1 𝛿𝑚 𝑧𝑚

(2)

where is a 1 x p vector of variables that could affect the efficiency of a country, and is a p x
1 vector of unknown parameters, the coefficients to be estimated. This variable measures
technical inefficiency across production units, the inefficiency effects are assumed to be
independently distributed for different countries and years (Wang and Wong, 2012). This
variable accounts for heterogeneity across countries that can cause deviations from the
maximum potential output.
Thus, technical efficiency (TE), defined as the ratio of actual output to the maximum
output is calculated as in equation (3) and takes on values of 0 and 1, 1 indicating full technical
efficiency.
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 ) |𝜀𝑖𝑡 ]

(3)

For interpretation sake, as the model estimates how far a country’s actual output is
compared to its maximum output. The smaller the coefficient

in equation (2), the more

efficient the country is. This tells us that the distance between the maximum output level and
actual output level is small. This illustrated in Figure 3.
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3. Data and Empirical Specification
3.1 Data
The research question we are addressing in this paper is what economic, political and
socioeconomic factors affect agricultural productivity. To answer this question, we will be
looking at 138 countries with varying institutional qualities, ranging from high income to
low income countries, over the last three decades (1984-2013). To estimate the maximum
production function, we use panel data on output from USDA-ERS (2013) and conventional
agricultural inputs; land, labor, fertilizer, machinery (tractors) and livestock from FAOSTAT
(2018). The descriptive statistics for the dataset are available in Table 1.
Agricultural output is the quantity of agricultural production in millions of constant
2004-2006 U.S dollars. Agricultural land is measured as the sum of arable land and
permanent crops, as defined by FAOSTAT (2018) in thousand hectares. Agricultural labor is
measured as the number of people who are economically involved agriculture. Fertilizer is
the quantity of fertilizer plant nutrient in use (N, P2O5, and K2O) measured in metric tons.
Farm machinery is he number of agricultural tractors in use. The livestock variable is the
number of animals on farms, measured in thousands.
Following Fulginiti et. al (2004), we use two different types of efficiency changing
variables in our analysis, those that allow for qualitative input differences, which are used as
controls and those that capture institutional differences across countries. We use four input
quality measures: (1) labor quality, proxied by school attainment taken from Barro-Lee(2015),
(2) land quality, proxied by percentage of land irrigated taken from FAOSTAT (2018), (3)
Drought, which controls for environmental changes, measured by the number of occurrences
in a country for a given year taken from CRED EM-DAT (2009). Lastly, we include an
openness variable, not included in past literature, this is meant to capture any effects of trade
policy within a country, data was calculated by the GDP share of imports and exports taken
from World Bank (2018). The openness variable is also used to represent any variation we
may observe from a country’s openness, such as foreign investments and to a lesser degree
research and development.
We also include a variable for the numbers of years since each country has been
independent. This allows for exogenous variation in the model and strengthens our
institutional analysis. Although Fulgniti et al. (2004) find no significance, we find there to be
an effect when paired with social harmony. This suggests that the longer the country has
been independent, the more efficient it is in agricultural productivity. This data was retrieved
from Hensel (2014).
7

The institutional variables are taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG,
2018). The ICRG rating provides 22 variables for political, financial and economic subcategories. However, we use the Political Risk Rating sub-category as it contains measures
across each category, covering both political and social risk ratings. The Political Risk Rating
comprises of twelve variables where the minimum number of points for each component is
zero and the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight each component is
given in the overall political risk assessment. (PRS Group, 2012). The data is interpreted as
the lower the risk rating, the higher the risk and the higher the risk rating, the lower the risk.
Thus, the twelve variables are Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment
Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religious
Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability and Bureaucracy
Quality. Table 2 shows each risk component, their maximum points and summary statistics
of the risk component in our data.
For simplification in our analysis, we group the twelve variables into three main
institutional indicators; Business Conditions, Social Harmony and Government Quality.
Table 3 shows the grouping system. Although, we do not find any formal analysis done with
this type of grouping, in their cross-country analysis, Hellman et. al (2000) point to the effect
bureaucracy quality and corruption have on the business environment. We include
investment profile as this is strongly linked to business environments and socioeconomic
conditions as well. We link the conflict variable to social harmony, the assumption is that
internal (ethnic or religious) and external conflicts affect the ability for people to coexist and
thrive hamoniously. Rothstein and Teorell (2008) in their study of government quality state
democracy, rule of law and efficiency in government as three concepts of quality of
governance which we follow in our paper. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of these
three institutional variables. These institutional ratings across countries is displayed in
Figure(s) 4, 5 and 6.
3.2

Empirical Specification

We model the production function (1) with a flexible trans log functional form. This
functional form, as opposed to the Cobb-Douglas functional form does not impose constant
elasticity of substitution. (Wang and Wong, 2012). The log-linear trans log production
function is thus:
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𝑙𝑛[𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡]𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑5𝑗=1 𝛽1𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ ∑5𝑗=1 𝛽2𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥 2
+ ∑5𝑗=1 ∑5𝑘>𝑗 𝛽3

𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑗𝑘

𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡

+ ∑5𝑗=1 𝛽4𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑇
+𝛽5 T + 𝛽5 𝑇 2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡

(4)

Where 𝑖 is from 1 to 138 representing the countries, and j is from 1 to 5 representing the
agricultural inputs (Land, labor, fertilizer, machinery and livestock) and the inputs represent
the inputs at each time period t from 1 to 30.
is the agricultural output, x’s are inputs and T is the time from 1 to 30, which is used
as a proxy for technical change. is the one-sided technical inefficiency measure, assumed to
be truncated at zero and normally distributed i.i.d. N(µ, ), capturing the heterogeneity across
countries which will help explain the differences we observe across countries. We also allow
for idiosyncratic error by including the random error , i.i.d. N(0,) which is independent of .
The technical inefficiency term is specified using the efficiency changing variables
and is estimated simultaneously with equation (4) as:
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + ∑5𝑚=1 𝛿𝑚 𝑧𝑚,𝑖𝑗𝑡

=𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
+𝛿2 𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛿3 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛿4 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
(5)

+ 𝛿5 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
Where each variable is given for each country i, at time t, tested for each input j.

The simultaneous maximum-likelihood procedure was made up of four sets of
specifications. Each of the institutional variables (Business Conditions, Social Harmony and
Government Quality) were tested on their own, using the qualitative input variables as
controls. The fourth test was of all the institutional variables combined in the model.
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4. Results
Empirical results are provided for each of the institutional variables, each containing four
regressions as the qualitative inputs are added to the model. As this is an efficiency study we
only include the technical inefficiency results.
Result 1 shows the results for Business Conditions on its own. The coefficient is small
and negative across all specifications which indicates that the increase in business conditions
leads to less inefficiency in agricultural productivity. In columns (2) to (4) we observe
significance in the irrigation and openness values as well. These values show stronger
significance as compared to the Business Conditions variable.
Result 2 shows the results for Social Harmony on its own. The coefficients here are also
small and negative. However, we only find significance in the first three columns (1) to (3)
without the Independence variable. Column (4) shows that when we include the variable for
years since independence, the effect of social harmony is not statistically significant. However,
irrigation, openness and school attainment are negative and significant.
Result 3 shows the results for Government Quality on its own. Here we observe
significance across all specifications (1) to (4). In columns (1) to (3), the coefficients are small
and negative which indicates that the quality of governance reduces agricultural inefficiency.
However, when we include years since independence, we observe that the coefficient on
government quality is positive but significant. Which indicates that better government
quality contributes to agricultural inefficiency. We believe that this is because of the fall in
productivity in most developed countries which coincide with better governance. Here as
well, irrigation, school attainment and openness are small and significant.
Result 4 shows the results for all institutional variables combined and all efficiency
changing qualitative inputs included. Here we observe negative and small coefficients for
both Business Conditions and Social Harmony. Still we see that better governance correlates
with less efficiency. However, we observe significance in the irrigation variable for columns
(1), (3) and (4).
The significance we find in irrigation is consistent with the findings by Block (1994),
Frisvold and Ingram (1995), Thirtle et al. (1995), Chan-Kang et. al (1999) and Fulginiti et al.
(2004). However, our results show drought to not be significant which is also consistent with
the above literatures but the coefficients on the value are small and negative, indicating that
drought decreases inefficiency. An explanation for this could be found in Rockstrom et al.’s
10

(2002) study looking at rainwater management in drought prone environments. The authors
find that there are no agro-hydrological limitations to productivity even in drought prone
environments as farmers adopt more risk aversion strategies. The significance we observe in
the openness variable tells us that according to our study, open trade policies contribute to
decreasing agricultural inefficiency, as the flow of information and technology across borders,
bringing in innovations from research and development, this leads to more efficiency. We use
the openness variable as a proxy for research and development.
Result 5 shows the results of all institutional variables at different crop levels. These
categories were classified according to FAOSTAT (2018). Here we find that for almost all
crops our three institutional variables are not very significant. However, Figure 8 shows that
beverages and spices have the highest yield across all regions, and we see significance in the
land quality variable, percentage of land irrigated.
Figure 6 shows technical efficiency across all regions using the TE function in equation
(3) estimated with the composite political risk variable (all 12 institutional indicators). We
find that North America has had the most consistent and high level of efficiency, close to 1.
We also find that technical efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa has been quite high, close to 1.
Across all regions, we see a sharp decrease in technical efficiency coinciding with the years
2008-2010. In their study of decisions made by agricultural and non-agricultural banks prerecession, Li et al. (2018) confirm the impact the recession had on efficiency in the agricultural
sector which is shown in the graph. In addition, we test out Fulginiti et al.(2004)’s result
that show higher technical efficiency for former British colonies. We find this to be true as
evidenced in Figure 8.

5. Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this study was to see if the differences in agricultural productivity across
countries could be explained by institutional indicators. To accomplish this, we use a
stochastic production frontier model to estimate a maximum output level and using efficiency
changing variables, including the institutional variables, we run tests to see if these variables
decrease or increase inefficiency.
We use a panel dataset with 138 countries over 30 years with output as the measure of
productivity and include five conventional input variables (land, labor, fertilizer, machinery
and livestock) to estimate the production function. For our inefficiency function, we use the
institutional variables and four qualitative input variables; irrigation, as a proxy for land
quality, school attainment as a proxy for labor quality, drought for environmental conditions
11

and openness for trade policy. The institutional variables we use are made up of ICRG’s
Political risk ratings and are Business Conditions, Social Harmony and Government Quality.
Our results show that on their own, each of the three institutional indicators are small,
negative and significant which indicates that they could decrease inefficiency, meaning that
they increase efficiency. However, when we include years since independence, we find that no
significance in Government Quality. This result coincides with the decrease in agricultural
productivity we find in high income countries with better government quality. We also see
significance in the openness and irrigation variables when we aggregate crop yields. This
leads us to conclude that the flow of information, ability to trade and access to global markets
contributes to decreasing inefficiency. In addition, land quality matters. We find there to be
strong evidence for better land quality having a positive impact on efficiency.
While the consistency we observe in the significance of the irrigation variable is
consistent with previous literature, it also indicates that there are other factors that impact
the efficiency of agricultural productivity beyond institutional reasons which could explain
the cross-country differences we observe. Omitted variable bias is a major concern in this
model as we cannot possibly include every single variable that affects efficiency, a missing
measure we are most concerned with is research and development.
There is strong evidence that agricultural research and development has a large impact
on productivity growth and that it has the most consistent influence on observed multifactor
productivity growth (Griliches 1973; Kendrick and Grossman 1980; Sveikauskaus and
Sveikauskaus 1982). Additionally, economic studies have shown that research and
development contribute to approximately 0.3 percent annually to productivity growth
(Griliches, 1980).
However, due to data limitations we could not include a measure for agricultural research
and development. However, we include openness and school attainment to capture the
impacts of research and development. The assumption we make here is that the more open a
country is to trade, the more we would observe increases in technological adoption which
should reflect in the output. Likewise, a more educated labor force could lead to a more
advanced approach to agriculture which should also reflect in the output. However, both
variables were not significant. The coefficient on school attainment is small and negative but
openness is positive.
Our study showed that while institutions are important in the efficiency of agricultural
output, they may not necessary explain the differences in productivity we observe across
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countries. To explore this more, we recommend that further study be done including a
measure of agricultural research and development.
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Appendix
FIGURE 1: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

Note: Agricultural productivity growth across income levels
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
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FIGURE 3: EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION
FRONTIER MODEL

Note: F represents the production function at the maximum
output level, xi represents country I whose actual output is yi,
thus, the technical inefficiency measures the distance between
yj (the maximum output level) and yi (the actual output level).
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OUTPUT AND INPUT VARIABLES
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES
N
y
Output (Millions $)
873
x (inputs)
Labour (Millions
873
Persons)
Fertilizer (Millions
873
Tonnes)
Land (1000 Ha)
873
Animals (Millions
873
Head)
Machinery (1000 in
873
Use)
µ (efficiency
variables)
Irrigation (1000 Ha)
859
Drought
873
(Occurrence)
Openness
867
School Attainment
629
Independence
873

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

342

838

0.22

5250

45.08

142.00

0.01

660.00

12.62

53.47

0.00

426.00

22.32
736.00

41.43
1760.00

0.00
0.69

187.78
8940.00

387.95

763.06

0.01

4592.55

5.55
0.14

13.61
0.42

0.00
0.00

64.50
3.00

67.27
8.24
150

33.54
2.32
194

0.02
1.21
20

218.85
13.10
1070

Note: S.D refers to the Standard Deviation
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF POLITICAL RISK ASSESMENT
COMPONENT
MEAN
S.D. MIN MAX
MAX
(DATA)* (POSSIBLE POINTS) **
GOVERNMENT STABILITY
7.4
2.2
1
12
12
SOCIOECONOMIC
4.8
1.7
0.5
10
12
CONDITIONS
INVESTMENT PROFILE
6.7
2.2
0
12
12
INTERNAL CONFLICT
8.0
2.4
0
12
12
EXTERNAL CONFLICT
9.4
2.1
0
12
12
CORRUPTION
2.5
0.9
0
6
6
MILITARY IN POLITICS
2.9
1.6
0
6
6
RELIGIOUS TENSIONS
4.3
1.4
0
6
6
LAW AND ORDER
3.0
1.1
0
6
6
ETHNIC TENSIONS
3.7
1.4
0
6
6
DEMOCRATIC
3.3
1.3
0
6
6
ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAUCRACY QUALITY
1.7
0.9
0
4
4
TOTAL
57.7
11.8 8.5
83.1
100
Note: S.D refers to the Standard Deviation
*This is the maximum points for our data
** This is the maximum points in the composite index by ICRG
TABLE 3: COMPONENTS OF MAIN INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Business
Social
Government
Condition
Harmony
Quality
Socioeconomic
Internal
Government
Conditions
Conflict
Stability
Investment
External
Law and Order
Profile
Conflict
Corruption
Religion
Democratic
Tension
Accountability
Bureaucracy
Ethnic
Military in
Quality
Tensions
Politics
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MAIN INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Variables
N
Mean S. D. Min Max
Business
Condition
Social Harmony

3,872

0.53

0.18

0.02

0.96

3,872

0.72

0.17

0.04

1.00

Government
3,872
0.62 0.17
Quality
Note: S.D refers to the Standard Deviation

0.04

0.97
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FIGURE 4: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS

FIGURE 5: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF SOCIAL HARMONY

FIGURE 5: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF GOVERNMENT QUALITY
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FIGURE 6: AVERAGE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY ACROSS REGIONS
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FIGURE 7: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
IN AGRICULTURE

FIGURE 8: AVERAGE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY FOR COLONIAL RULE
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RESULTS FOR AGGREGATE OUTPUT
RESULT 1: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY
CONDITIONS
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
Business Conditions
-0.112***
-0.106**

ESTIMATES

FOR

(3)

(4)

-0.0957***
(0.0358)
-0.0411***
(0.0139)
-0.00385
(0.0345)
-0.00126**
(0.000492)
-0.0363
(0.0241)

BUSINESS

(0.0370)
-0.0371**
(0.0146)
-0.0380
(0.0611)

(0.0419)
-0.0402***
(0.0141)
0.00437
(0.0355)
-0.00112**
(0.000449)

Log Likelihood

1237.7

1245.0

1253.4

-0.0548*
(0.0324)
-0.0378***
(0.00966)
-0.0153
(0.0306)
-0.00126**
(0.000523)
-0.0307
(0.0213)
-0.000180
(0.000148)
1288.0

Wald Chi-square

1652734.9

1998027.5

2661239.6

7493691.7

YES

YES

YES

624

624

624

Irrigation
School Attainment
Openness
Drought
Independence

Country Fixed Effects
YES
Observations
625
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10
** p<.05

*** p<.01"

24

RESULT 2: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR SOCIAL HARMONY
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Social Harmony
-0.152***
-0.150**
-0.157*** -0.0521
(0.0417)
-0.0450***
(0.00770)
-0.0437
(0.0286)

(0.0655)
-0.0369
(0.0303)
0.0116
(0.0336)
-0.00102
(0.000719)

(0.0460)
-0.0377***
(0.0129)
0.00861
(0.0349)
-0.00105**
(0.000453)
-0.0355
(0.0244)

Log Likelihood

1322.1

1247.9

1249.4

(0.0434)
-0.0540***
(0.00901)
-0.0781**
(0.0344)
-0.00146***
(0.000498)
-0.0226
(0.0220)
-0.000403**
(0.000173)
1287.7

Wald Chi-square

123008502.9

2580132.6

2372916.3

3203419.4

YES

YES

YES

624

624

624

Irrigation
School Attainment
Openness
Drought
Independence

Country Fixed Effects
YES
Observations
625
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10
** p<.05

*** p<.01"

RESULT 3: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR GOVERNMENT
QUALITY
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Government Quality
-0.0508
-0.0793**
-0.0862** 0.111**
(0.0777)
-0.0299
(0.0327)
-0.0511
(0.128)

(0.0368)
-0.0289***
(0.00947)
-0.00337
(0.0343)
-0.000891**
(0.000403)

(0.0409)
-0.0299*
(0.0177)
-0.00832
(0.0339)
-0.000940
(0.000603)
-0.0318
(0.0260)

Log Likelihood

1255.8

1247.1

1246.2

(0.0542)
-0.0518***
(0.0104)
-0.133***
(0.0311)
-0.00117***
(0.000436)
-0.0147
(0.0355)
-0.000835
(0.00147)
1291.2

Wald Chi-square

7020042.2

1596220.8

2995715.7

1568481.8

YES

YES

YES

624

624

624

Irrigation
School Attainment
Openness
Drought
Independence

Country Fixed Effects
YES
Observations
625
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10
** p<.05

*** p<.01"
25

RESULT
4:
TECHNICAL
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
VARIABLES
(1)
Business Conditions
-0.0792
Social Harmony
Government Quality
Irrigation
School Attainment

(0.0623)
-0.126**
(0.0630)
0.0359
(0.0873)
-0.0378***
(0.0130)
-0.0205
(0.0434)

Openness

INEFFICIENCY

ESTIMATES

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0555
(0.125)
-0.120
(0.0731)
0.0422
(0.194)
-0.0394
(0.0450)
0.0192
(0.0305)
-0.00106
(0.000737)

-0.0665
(0.0594)
-0.114*
(0.0652)
0.0233
(0.0980)
-0.0384*
(0.0203)
0.0140
(0.0355)
-0.00104**
(0.000482)
-0.0346
(0.0234)

-0.112**
(0.0555)
-0.0848
(0.0751)
0.0792
(0.0792)
-0.0335***
(0.0122)
0.00410
(0.0419)
-0.000614
(0.000469)
-0.00838
(0.0332)
-0.000787

Drought
Independence
Log Likelihood
1240.9
Wald Chi-square
1654459.4
Country Fixed Effects
YES
Observations
625
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10
** p<.05

FOR

1260.5
2456512.4

1251.3
2403785.8

(0.000590)
1260.9
1658555.0

YES

YES

YES

624

624

624

*** p<.01"
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ALL

RESULT 5: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES: CROP LEVEL
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